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Abstract
With the aim of methodological reflection, this article analyses 
the three approaches (realist, constructivist and relational) in 
international relations theory most commonly employed to study 
foreign policy and the global influence of the European Union. Pivotal 
notions such as ‘agency’, ‘identity’, ‘norms’, ‘system’ and ‘practice’ 
provide us with navigation points between these approaches, 
enabling us to achieve a clearer impression of the many different 
meanings these terms can contain. These meanings, in their turn, fix 
the direction, limitations and scope of any concrete theoretic analysis. 
This article is meant to draw particular attention to Bourdieuvian 
practice theor y and Alexander Bogdanov’s tektology as two 
differing variants of relationism, with a view to overcoming certain 
deficiencies in application to the studies of the EU of methodological 
individualism, as employed in more ‘traditional’ theories. To illustrate 
the relationalist way of theorising when dealing with the paradoxes 
of the EU external policies and global role, a follow-up interpretation, 
based on tektology, is given in conclusion to the resilience turn in the 
EU global strategy.
On the Norms and Habits 
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Introduction
The external relations of the European Union (EU) extend 
to almost every, and even the most remote, place on Earth. 
The EU also possesses a profuse arsenal of foreign policy 
instruments – diplomatic, economic and (to a lesser extent), 
military. Yet the Union has not acquired the complete array of 
foreign policy responsibilities as those enjoyed by sovereign 
states. One of the most important specialisms carried out by 
the EU in the international arena, and to some extent fitting the 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) description of the EU (Manners 
2002), consists of ‘exporting’ abroad original techniques to 
foster intergovernmental cooperation, global governance and 
regional integration. It thus seems problematic to our full 
comprehension of the global role and international status of 
the EU if we rely exclusively on the more traditional theories 
of International Relations (IR), either realist or constructivist, 
which are often state-centric. Yet to depend instead on theories 
of regional integration could equally be ill-judged. These 
theories, including an alternative, a critical integration theory, 
embracing some recent developments in IR theory, notably the 
structure-agency debate (Bulmer and Joseph 2016), are namely 
more focused on what goes on within the EU, not beyond its 
borders or with the EU in the global context. 
The wider sphere of IR never stays unchanged: promising 
theories and methodologies are continually developing and 
progressing. Inter alia, recent years have seen a growing influence 
exerted by the theoretical heritage of the French sociologist, 
Pierre Bourdieu (Adler-Nissen 2013). As the purpose of this study 
is not to assess whether or not the EU ‘really’ is an international 
actor of some particular kind or definition, but to focus instead 
on the issue of perceived (in)adequacy of its activities in respect 
to the evolving international ‘environment’ (Hill 1993; Börzel, 
Risse 2009; Veebal, Markus 2018), Bourdieuvian practice theory 
seems particularly relevant (Adler and Pouliot 2011). In the 
meantime, much less noted organisation theory (tektology) by 
Russian revolutionary and analyst Alexander Bogdanov could 
also turn out to be of use when discussing today the pertinence 
of practice turn in international relations for the study of the 
EU role (Bogdanov 1984). With such considerations in mind, 
this article attempts to take stock of the current IR theories 
being employed to study the EU’s international influence, so as 
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intention of stressing the importance of designedly describing 
the world with and around the EU in terms of relations, 
primarily or exclusively (Schneider 2015). 
The article consists of five key parts: the immediate section 
following is devoted to detecting a problematic aspect in the 
existing conceptualisations of the EU as an international actor/
agent in organisational terms. The two subsequent sections 
discuss the specifics of prevalent realist and constructivist IR 
approaches. The fourth part illustrates the ways some putative 
‘breaches’ can be rectified with the assistance of Bourdieu’s 
epistemological relationalism. The fifth and concluding section 
discusses Bogdanov’s empiriomonist (phenomenological) 
methodology (Gorelik 1983) as potentially helpful in adjusting 
our understanding of the European Union’s relations to the 
outer world.  
Conceptualising the EU
As is well known, due to the EU’s unclear form as a political 
entity, it is rather challenging to find an adequate analytical 
framework to deal with it. As far as it concerns its political 
form, the EU is unique (sui generis) – something between a 
state and an international organisation. On the one hand, 
when regarded as a (quasi)state, the EU, more often than not, 
is interpreted as a prime example of the post-modern state: 
“more pluralist, more complex, less centralised than the 
bureaucratic modern state” (Cooper 2000: 31).  Yet some authors 
prefer to stress the resemblance of the Union to ‘normal’ states 
(Kreppel 2012). Equally, the EU can be cast as an international 
organisation, albeit a distinctive one – closely conforming to 
the type of meta-organisation (MO) featured by Goran Ahrne 
and Nils Brunsson (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008).  MOs started to 
perform as the agents of global governance (Ahrne, Brunsson 
and Kerwer 2016: 5) and could thus no longer be adequately 
treated as simple arenas for states’ representatives to interact 
in. Meta-organisations bear some resemblance to biological 
communities (such as swarms’ or ants’ colonies) (Tautz and 
Heilmann 2008). At the same time, we can speak of them 
as a unique technology for organising inter-linkages and 
interactions among a group of states. One way or another, it 
might be useful, as Bogdanov’s tektology invites us to do, to 
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with our understanding of the (system) attributes of the EU as 
a complex object under study.
In classical organisation theory (OT) organisations are defined 
as units of people (not of states), enjoying exclusive rights as its 
members, and acting on the basis of established principles and 
rules in pursuance of collective goals. Traditional OT is more 
focused on exposing the structural characteristics of decision-
making within organisations, meaning not only their formal 
structures but also their informal and network-type inter-
linkages, along with socio-cultural and cognitive aspects 
of organisational design. In this respect, Zuzana Murdoch 
(2015) has signalised the added value of OT to the sphere of EU 
studies. This theory also seeks to expose the relations between 
organisations in particular environments, as well as the 
influence of the institutional environment over the behaviour 
and development of organisations.
As a distinctive political system with similarities to both states 
and international organisations, the European Union has given 
birth to the concept of multi-level governance – MLG (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001). The applicability of this concept to the study 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, despite 
the state-centric features of the CFSP, has been demonstrated 
by Michael Smith (Smith 2004). Yet the EU, as a multi-level 
governance system, is a political ‘subject’ of an unusual kind. 
It is transnational, has no central government of its own, and 
takes shape behind the backs of national governments.
The introduction of MLG in the EU caused the diffusion of 
regulating authority in the system. Trends of opaque bargaining 
are in play, involving different levels of governance. Due to 
that, the key values of democratic governance can be sacrificed 
by the governing elite, time and again, to achieve trade-offs 
in a closer circle, to find intergovernmental consensus or to 
improve efficiency in supranational decision-making (Peters 
and Pierre 2004: 85). The subsidiarity principle is of particular 
importance for the MLG macroregional arrangement, as it 
provides a stress on limiting the role of states (they should 
interfere as little as possible in the performance of communes 
and societies). At first sight, this principle might seem univocal. 
It was introduced in the EU to avert excessive supranational 
centralisation. In one respect, it allows member states to retroact 
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their domestic affairs. On another level, European decision-
making practice becomes involute. Supranational institutions 
can hypothetically take advantage of subsidiarity for purposes 
other than it was intended for – by «hiding» behind it in order 
to refrain from urgent action in a complicated situation. At 
the same time, subsidiarity has a democratic dimension. It 
reflects considerations related to the extent of the proximity 
of citizens to the decision-making centres and the right to self-
rule (Strezhneva 2018: 21–7).
The external policy and involvement of the EU in global 
policy formulations are being realised not only via the 
intergovernmental CFSP but, more importantly, as part of 
supranational and transnational governance, elaborated 
within the EU system and spilling over ad extra. The impulse 
of the multi-level EU ‘system’, whether out of expediency or 
as a reflexive reaction, to externalise itself can meet with 
resistance, both inside the Union and in third countries, once 
more accustomed forms of another actor’s political existence 
become challenged by the changes it envisions. 
To analyse the foundations of subjecthood, or agency 
(the term he himself preferred), Bourdieu introduced the 
concept of habitus (dispositions, habits and inclinations) 
as a semiconscious, but lasting, orientation that people 
have, forming the basis of their perceptions and experience 
(Bourdieu 1977: 78). Habitus involves “trained capacities and 
structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determinate 
ways, which then guide (agents – M.S.) …in their creative 
responses to the constraints and solicitations of their extant 
milieu” (Wacquant 2005: 317). If seen in this light, the behaviour 
of the EU in the international arena might be, more likely than 
not, driven by the urge of the European ruling elite to achieve 
better correspondence (isomorphism, to be discussed later) 
between the Union and its (mostly state-centric) international 
milieu, rendering the surrounding international space ‘more 
habitable’ to it. According to Bogdanov’s more general view, 
each human collective, irrespective of its origin, would tend to 
organise the surrounding space in order to render it habitable.
When in need to clarify the international identity of the EU, 
experts have resorted to different, and sometimes rival, terms. 
These include civilian power (Duchene 1972; Börzel, Risse 
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(neo)empire (Kassab 2018: 141–59). Among these – and most 
useful for the purposes of the present article – is the notion 
of Market Power Europe (MPE) (Damro 2012, 2015), and the 
already-mentioned NPE. These highlight the specific resources 
(or capital, in Bourdieuvian parlance) of the Union as a non-
traditional international agent.
The concept of NPE endows the European Union with the ability 
to correct the widely adopted understanding of ‘normality’ 
in global affairs. Ian Manners finds the roots of this ability 
in the EU’s unique political form as a hybrid of national and 
international governance (Manners 2002: 240). The hybrid 
political form, according to Manners, predetermines the 
disposition of the Union (the collective habitus of the European 
elite) to change pre-existing (state-centric) norms in the 
international arena. In his view, it is impossible for the EU to 
behave differently, as to forgo its own transformative power 
in international relations would be equal to sacrificing the 
unique character of the Union (Manners 2002: 241–2).
Manners describes in detail how the external transmission of 
European norms can occur: either being spread through the 
influence of the example that the European Union gives to the 
rest of the world, or through institutionalisation (by forming a 
matrix of relations with other international actors), or through 
its immediate international presence (EU representations in 
third countries and international organisations). In this regard 
that “the EU’s attempt to invoke normative commitments from 
China and Russia has not been well-received” (Aggestam 2009: 
30) is not directly relevant. It is more relevant, though, for those 
who are inclined to regard China and Russia as belonging to 
an international system, where the post-modern EU, with its 
ethical stance, serves as the organising centre. With China and/
or Russia purportedly refuting such a perception, the European 
Union nevertheless can perfectly remain the embodiment of 
NPE in this understanding – as long as it is willingly accepted as 
such by a myriad of other international actors, not necessarily 
states, thus legitimising this (presumably alternative to the 
older one) post-modern international system.
Anyway, there are possible ways to interpret the normative 
powers of the EU, drifting away from Manners’ original template 
in different directions. One possible way is to view them as part 
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NPE “has become a grand narrative, an answer to the ever more 
pressing need to bestow an identity on Europe – legitimacy 
through foreign policy” (Gerrits 2009: 4). Paradoxically, this way 
prescribes external behaviour for the EU which third countries 
may find excessively Eurocentric (Bicchi 2006) – with the result 
being a decay in the EU’s self-imposed identity in the long run 
(Pavlova, Romanova 2017). Another way would be to stress the 
more or less stable ontological potential of the EU (its relatively 
high ability to change international norms), which is less 
questionable. Thus understood, the EU’s normative power can 
be exercised in competition with other international actors 
(such as the USA, China, Russia, Great Britain, and Germany), 
though it is not necessarily benign for these other actors.
In sociology, growing convergence between the processes and 
structures of one organisation with those in another as a result 
of imitation under pressure or in the course of autonomous 
development – and when experiencing the same limitations 
– is called isomorphism (Hannan, Freeman 1977). It is broadly 
defined as the propensity of organisations to resemble other 
organisations functioning in the same environment (Param 
and Bilimoria 1997). While the NPE concept takes for granted 
the transformative influence of the EU, there are in actuality 
two possible options to achieve closer isomorphism between 
the Union and its predominantly state-centric international 
milieu: in addition to attempting to change the milieu, the other 
possibility is for the EU to change itself (in accordance with 
the demands of state-centrism) and to become a traditionally 
‘normal’ state. In this way, the survival (external legitimacy) 
of the EU would be secured at the expense of losing its unique 
post-modern features. However, this option is the less likely 
one, given the current limitations to further centralisation in 
the EU.
The MPE or Regulatory Power Europe (Goldthau and Sitter 2015) 
models are interpretations, alternative to NPE. These models 
see the EU as exercising its power by externalising market-
related policies and regulations in particular. The MPE presents 
the EU as a global regulator, positioning itself as a key actor of 
‘managed globalization’, which relies on multilateral rules and 
international organisations (Abdelal and Meunier 2010).
As it turns out, both Manners and Damro find the most 
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export norms. In the case of the NPE, the norms in question 
emerge as constitutive: creating or defining an (international) 
activity, they provide (or are expected to provide) for the 
establishment of new institutional facts (contracts) and may 
lead to modification of the wider international system. In the 
MPE, we are dealing with regulative norms, the performance of 
direct duties, and conditional prohibitions and authorisations 
(Boella and van der Torre 2004). The NPE and MPE dynamics 
can in practice alternate and intertwine, bringing to life a 
Normative Market Europe (Geeraert and Drieskens 2017).
Realism
Statism (state-centrism), unlike wider notions such as 
interests and power, is not an integral reference point in the 
theory of political realism. Instead, its third major premise, 
along with these two, is not state-centrism, but groupism. The 
idea of groupism is that, in order to ensure their security and 
survival, people tend to adhere to group solidarity and to 
develop institutionalised practices that encourage them to 
depend on their own groups (Wohlforth 2008),  or collective 
actors. The definition of a collective actor can reasonably 
include not just states, but also supranational integrated 
communities (such as the EU). The EU can thus be accepted in 
the realist framework as an international actor with its own 
interests and its own powers.
Neorealism inherently treats the EU as one of the subsystems 
of the international system (Hoffmann 1966). Yet, while sharing 
the broad systemic vision, many realist-minded authors are 
ready to accept the EU as an international actor in its own right, 
though deploying different explanations and interpretations 
for its specific nature.1 One of these approaches focuses on the 
EU’s use of soft power (Michalski 2005; Kugiel 2017).
Both analysts and EU officials agree that the consistent 
employment of soft power instruments is one of the EU’s main 
strengths in the international sphere, given the rich repertoire 
of civilian tools it possesses. At the same time, the EU’s soft 
power has its limitations, as demonstrated by present-day 
developments in Ukraine, meaning that it does not give the 
1 A Bourdieuvian critique of the neorealist understandings of the international system 
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EU much ability to resolve the conflict. It should be noted that 
the EU does have hard power as well, coming first via its crisis 
management capabilities and sanctions policies, which are 
being applied more widely and consistently as time passes.
In sum, soft power as a description does not fully define the 
EU’s role and has become a less accurate description under 
the present circumstances in Europe. As former Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker admitted in 2016, “soft power 
is no longer enough in the EU’s increasingly dangerous 
neighbourhood” (Juncker 2016: 18), and in this context, the 
boundaries between what is supposed to constitute its hard 
and soft power have become ever more fuzzy.2
Another way to account for the EU’s specific character in realist 
fashion is in addressing the milieu goals, an approach proposed 
by Arnold Wolfers (1962). This means shaping the environmental 
conditions (goals in the fields of development, ecology, 
labour rights and public health) within which international 
actors operate, as contrasted with possession goals (access to 
energy, trade preferences and migration controls). In this way, 
power is understood as the capacity to influence someone or 
something. The ‘milieu goals’ concept is usefully pointing to 
the interdependence of (national, regional) interests and global 
goals. According to Nathalie Tocci:
Furthering milieu goals may actually contribute to 
the advancement of possession goals. However, unlike 
possession goals, milieu goals are pursued consistently 
over time, and not only at the time when they also represent 
immediate possession goals (Tocci 2007: 4).
Yet another conceptual route is offered by the position of 
neoclassical realism, or modified realism, made distinctive 
by its acceptance of state-level causal variables. According 
to Dmitry Vasfilov, who applied this schema, the post-Soviet 
competition between Russia and the EU is higher than required 
by the international system (perceived by him, as a realist, as 
consisting mostly of states) because, due to the influence of a 
number of internal factors, elites in both Russia and the EU are 
unable to adequately understand and process the signals sent 
2 As formulated by Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter (2015: 109–16), in the politics of oil, gas, 
and climate change, the EU exercises two intermediary forms of power simultaneously 
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by the ‘objective’ system (Vasfilov 2014).
The above variations notwithstanding, present-day realist 
approaches tend not to reflect on the underlying state-centrism 
of realism per se. This leads to the underestimation by realist-
minded researchers of the unique character of the European 
Union’s existence, as a decentralised polity, itself being an 
important factor, influencing the EU’s relations with the 
outside world. The roots of the statist orientation can be found 
in the realist reification of geopolitics as a domain separable 
from ‘the social’ (Davenport 2013). 
Constructivism
The uniqueness of the EU as a global actor is often supposed 
to consist, at least to some extent, in its ability to create new 
meanings and perceptions in the international arena. Because 
of this, constructivism may be a more suitable model for 
studying the EU’s international role. Constructivists interpret 
the world as being created by actors through internal models 
(constructs). As an analytical approach, constructivism is an 
umbrella for many different currents, yet constructivism does 
not always tear away from state-centrism. 
Alexander Wendt, a leading constructivist in IR, pointed out 
that intersubjective meanings determined cause-and-effect 
relationships in the anarchic international system. In his 
interpretation, international actors (mostly states) can give 
new meanings to foreign policy practices. Thus, in the 1990s, 
he drew an overoptimistic picture of the linear progression 
of the development of the international system. He predicted 
that growing interdependence, homogenisation, the sense of 
common destiny and self-restraint would, in future, allow for a 
transfer to a more amicable international system (Wendt 1992; 
1999).
At this stage Wendt (like realists) spoke of 'individual' states, 
being the elements of one and the same 'material' system, 
in which prevailing ideologies – forming that part of the 
environment that is changeable – guided the behaviour of all 
the states and other noticeable actors. These states and actors 
were endowed with an individual mentality and purpose, 
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identity through reproduction and transformation – through 
intersubjective dynamics at the systemic level (Wendt 1994). 
Later on, Wendt came to the idea of proposing methodologically 
holistic sociology as meta-theoretical grounds for IR, having 
found his new anchorage in quantum physics (Wendt 2015; 
Little 2018). Pointing out the »relational quality of meaning 
and practices«, Wendt (together with James Der Derian) opted 
for what they called the relational ontology of consciousness, 
suggesting that consciousness could be the manifestation of our 
entanglement with the world and with each other (Der Derian 
and Wendt 2020). Quanta are neither particles (individua) nor 
waves and mean superposition (overlapping, adding together 
of several quantum states). According to ‘new’ Wendt, neither 
states nor the EU as a whole should from now on be treated 
separately as independent agents, because they are ‘entangled’ 
as a result of the waves’ interference effect (Alekseeva, Mineev, 
Loshkariov 2016).
Given that the post-modern external policy of the European 
Union is concentrated to a considerable extent on subjective 
structures, contexts and non-material aspects of power and 
influence (such as identity, beliefs and legitimacy), many 
constructivists – mostly following in Wendt’s tracks – insisted 
on the exclusive ability of the EU (presumably being beyond 
‘ordinary’ states in terms of its socio-cultural development), 
to transform the international system in a positive (non-
confrontational) way. The NPE concept, mentioned above, was 
based on understandings that were notably similar to this one.
Manners views the norm-based behaviour of the EU (the 
promotion of broader norms of peace, democracy and 
fundamental rights, as well as of the rule of law, social progress, 
anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good 
governance) as a means by which it constructs a benevolent 
identity for itself, and uses this benevolent identity in its 
efforts to build a better world. NPE thus presented cannot be 
regarded as an analytical device: it is not meant to portray the 
EU and its qualitatively different contra-Westphalian (Manners, 
Whitman 2003: 399) international role as it is (or used to be), but 
as it should be or is predetermined to become. It amounts to a 
statement of the EU’s inherent goodness, a goodness that the 
Union is not supposed to step aside from. An elaboration of this 
similar strongly normative idea is that it is (or rather should 









XXVI (87) 2020, 
6-31
a multilateral basis, founded on the progressive development 
of international law, exporting its values of the rule of law and 
sophisticated governance mechanisms to the international 
sphere.
The form of constructivist treatment of the EU as described 
above goes hand in hand with an identity conundrum (a 
mismatch between how the EU is perceived by its own elites 
and by others) (Santino Jr. 2013), because it can, in Europe 
itself, stimulate the ignorance of the widespread (under)
appreciation and (mis)understanding of the EU as a global actor 
by many other inhabitants in the international environment. 
Additionally, the reality that might be brought into existence 
by the normative power of the EU is a good or a bad thing 
depending on the normative stance of the evaluator (Diez, Pace 
2007), and not only of the EU itself.
While combining relational ontology with (post)positivist 
epistemology (as Wendt does), some constructivists may 
find difficulty in generalising practical mechanisms 
which are indispensable for bringing about ‘social’ change 
(Øhrgaard 2018:  35–6). At the same time, as an influential 
example of methodological pragmatism, Wendt’s theory 
opened an analytically productive way to studies, combining 
constructivism and rationalism more freely in the research of 
the EU’s external relations along broadly understood pragmatic 
lines – in accordance with the appeal “for a pragmatic turn 
in research and methodology” (Friedrichs, Kratochwil 2009: 
702). For a pragmatist (as well as for Bogdanov with his 
phenomenological approach), differences between the contexts 
in which an object of study is examined cause demand to arise 
for all of the techniques and treatments available, inviting 
researchers to step over doctrinal and even interdisciplinary 
boundaries.  In consonance with the pragmatic view just 
described, Petr Kratochvil and Elsa Tulmets have proposed 
a combination of social constructivism and rationalism to 
study the EU’s external relations, immediately testing the 
applicability of this model to the relationships of Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia with the Union (Kratochvíl and Tulmets 
2010). In their publications, they treat both approaches as 
equipollent analytical lenses that can be put on or taken off in 
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Epistemological relationalism
Unlike substantionalist IR theories, such as neorealism or 
neoliberal institutionalism, ontological relationalism orients 
researchers to the study of objects as embedded in the context 
of their interlinkages. Within a relational ontology, we deal with 
the “modifications of being, elements that can be different from 
each other but that can’t truly be separated from each other” 
(de Ronde and Fernandez Moujan 2017: 7). But Bourdieu, while 
assuming intentionality-drivenness of human behaviour 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 9; Marcoulatos 2003), expects field theorists, 
when studying relational structures, to think epistemologically 
and to take a break from commonsensical understandings 
(Singh 2019) because he finds common sense to be inhibiting 
a clearer comprehension of the world (Bourdieu, Coleman 
2019: 373–87).  Bourdieu directs a rational-minded researcher 
towards field research to discover and lay bare structures, 
existing independently from agents’ purpose and awareness. 
As a case in point, the European External Action Service does 
not visibly challenge the existence of national diplomacy. Yet 
its development puts under question the perceived monopoly 
of the ‘normal’ states to determine what is to be accepted as 
‘authentic’ diplomacy (Adler-Nissen 2014). 
Respective fields can emerge at the transnational level, once 
there is structural interaction of certain groups of agents, 
related to transnational goals (problems). Defining states in 
general (and the EU as a post-modern state in particular) as 
relational structures is appropriate when considering the 
forms of the EU participation in international affairs. The EU 
external relations are being realised in combinations of specific 
governance modes, first taking shape within the Union, and 
then appearing in the international deflection. Yet, as pointed 
out by Didier Bigo with reference to states: 
…many sectors of life are not dependent or subordinate to 
state boundaries and the extent of their territory. They are 
multiple and transversal to the states (Bigo 2011: 249), 
with the construction of a transnational space of institutions 
and elite practices being presumably inseparable for the 
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The substantialist epistemological obstacle (Bachelard 2002: 
24–32) could make a researcher opine that the EU promotes 
its norms abroad with the exact aim for these norms to be 
adopted by third countries. The Europeanisation of the world 
at large that the EU is striving for could then be presented as a 
modernist bureaucratic strategy of managing the globalisation 
risks of the EU itself through a projection of its own internal 
order abroad (Medvedev 2008). Bourdieuvian epistemological 
approach allows experts to regard the meaning of the actions 
of the EU from a different angle: the Union (or, rather, the people 
responsible for European institutions) may, not always fully 
self-consciously or with thoroughly thought-out plans, seek to 
disseminate ad extra the very model of regulation established 
within the EU they have become accustomed to – to the point of 
regarding it as ‘natural’ and unproblematic. In this way they are 
inducing an institutional isomorphism between the EU and its 
international environment, trying to make the latter ‘homelike’, 
more like integrated Europe in an organisational sense, and 
instinctively rendering the surrounding international space 
habitable for themselves, fashioning it in accordance with the 
EU’s frames of reference.
At the same time, as Bourdieu’s is a social critical approach to 
studying practices, oriented to the study of competition and 
conflict, his theory gives us no additional opportunity to regard 
the EU as a meta-organisation, prominent in constructive, 
cooperative, innovative modes of global governance. For 
Bourdieu, the adaptability of relational structures remains 
doubtful. Bogdanov is markedly more optimistic in that respect. 
The undeservingly half-remembered theory of organisation 
(tektology) Bogdanov created can be presented as a missing 
link in the foundation of the present-day relational IR and 
European studies. 
Tektology
According to the Russian scientist and revolutionary 
Alexander Bogdanov (1873–1928) (Bogdanov 1984; Gorelik 
1983), organisational regularities are the same for objects of 
any kind (natural, social and psychic). The more the whole 
differs from the sum of its parts, the higher is its sophistication 
in organisational terms. At the same time, he regarded 









XXVI (87) 2020, 
6-31
process, resulting from never-ending states of equilibrium 
transition, conforming to organisational regularities (Tarassov 
1998). He also highlighted two basic organising mechanisms 
for such complexes: construction (implying uniting smaller 
complexes with all sorts of links) and (self)governance.
Complexes can conjugate, form chain connections, 
ingressions (a form of catenation through some intermedia) 
or disingressions (when joined together, activities mutually 
paralyse each other, leading to the emergence of a 'boundary', or 
separateness).3 Relations between complexes can be integrative 
(organised), disintegrative (disorganised) or neutral, depending 
on the purposes realised by those who participate in their 
constructing. The master regulating mechanism Bogdanov 
denominates as ‘collecting’ (podbor in Russian). It can be either 
conservative or progressive selection (natural or artificial). 
Darwin’s natural selection then becomes a specific instance of 
this podbor, which he applies to the processes of perdurance and 
disintegration of organisations of all possible types. Market 
competition can be singled out as an example of conservative 
(rule-based) regulative selection mechanism in Bogdanov’s 
understanding. It’s selective (discovery) function was indeed 
highly esteemed by both ordoliberal economists and Friedrich 
Hayek. Bogdanov expects the workings of podbor to assist 
in making integrative organisational forms prevail over 
disintegrative ones in the long run.
Bogdanov is to be recognised as an author of the general systems 
theory along with Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Gare 2000), an 
Austrian biologist, who described the organisational principles 
for open systems with non-equilibrium thermodynamics 
(metabolically attached to their environment). Earlier than 
Bertalanffy, Bogdanov already spoke of dynamic or floating 
counterpoise of organised systems and their ‘uncontrolled’ 
environment. In his description, one equiponderant, persistent 
(self-adjusting, resilient) configuration of a complex aggregate, 
achieved due to antidromous activities, inevitably gives way 
to another one. And, unlike Bertalanfy, Bogdanov regards the 
3 An illustration for paralysing internal disingression Bogdanov found in the figure of 
Hamlet, the main character of the play by Shakespeare, whose divided self is forming 
a ‘complex’, the components of which are cancelling each other out. The processes of 
selection, set in motion by a hostile environment, result in the destruction of the Hamlet 
complex (in the “insanity”, then death, of Hamlet himself), but ‘system equilibrium’ is 
then restored in the play (and supported by Hamlet’s own deathbed will) in the character 
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uncoordinated environment as both the source of uncertainty 
and a challenge for an organisation, relatively autonomous 
from it.
The general impression at this point is that tektology resonates 
rather well with the idea of resilience (ability to absorb changes 
and still exist), capturing “the transformative approach to 
complex change advocated by the EU” (Tocci 2020: 191), with the 
EU 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS) elevated into one of the guiding 
principles for the EU’s role in the world (A Global Strategy 2016; 
Korosteleva, Flockhart 2020).
The similarity of approaches between Bourdieu and Bogdanov 
can be attributed to the profound influence of Marx on both of 
them and, in particular, to the Marxian idea that society consists 
not so much of individuals as of relations. But this similarity 
should not be overstressed. An important difference is due 
to the fact that the former is closer to the phenomenological 
view of the social world and, unlike Bourdieu (Schindler and 
Wille 2019), is less mistrustful of practitioners’ own ability 
of theory-making, based on everyday experience (Jurt 2017). 
Empiriomonism (phenomenological Marxism) he developed 
meant the introduction of a conception of socially organised 
(contrasted with individual psychic) experience, focused on 
interactive practices culturally united groups of people would 
be involved in.
In tektology, the organisational scientific viewpoint is 
theoretically resharpened to serve in the capacity of a 
structural grid for an enlightened observer-practitioner, 
placed inside organisations’ dynamic interacting processes. 
For their scientific study, Bogdanov introduced an assortment 
of dual concepts: ‘activity – antiperistasis’, ‘assimilation – 
disassimilation’, ‘conjugation – discontinuity’ and other pairs. 
These pairs are not logical antinomies for him. Somewhat 
similar to how Bourdieu treated his ‘habitus’, ‘field’ and ‘capital’, 
Bogdanov sees his dual concepts as researcher’s operating 
tools for logging onto a reference space, with liberally variable 
observation focuses, in order to study collective ‘living’ 
organisations and their interrelations.
For Bogdanov, systems constitute the horizon, determining the 
limits, within which the real world arises (a fortiori partially) for 
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collectivist organisational culture (Bogdanov 1924). Collective 
deliberation thus becomes the basis for achieving a credible 
comprehension of reality. At the same time, he does not part 
with the idea of methodological individualism, as elаborated 
by Max Weber. This idea infers that social phenomena are to 
be treated through disclosure of how they eventuate out of 
individual activities. Those, in their turn, are to get their initial 
exegesis in the intentions, motivating actors. However, Weber 
notified that:
it is a tremendous misunderstanding to think that an 
‘individualistic’ method should involve what is in any 
conceivable sense an individualistic system of values (Weber 
1978: 18).
Bourdieu rejected the usefulness of the organic analogy, which, 
from Durkheim to Parsons, served as the basis for functionalist 
theories. For him, states are more likely to belong to relational 
structures. By default, they cannot be adaptive. Ad maximum, 
their resistance to (global, external) pressures can be analysed. 
Bogdanov, in his turn, would sooner agree with Wendt about 
states and quasi-states (like the EU) as social structures 
preferably being treated as “holographic organisms”, invested 
with collective intentionality (Wendt 2015: 34).  At the same time, 
in contrast with Wendt’s position, Bogdanov recognises the 
limitations of ‘social’ exchanges between complexes: as part of 
its life-sustaining activity, in tektological interpretation, each 
specified ‘organism’ (re)creates not the overall world, but some 
particular systematised environment for itself, which is always 
secondary to the structure of the ‘organism’ itself. Summing 
up, the external communication of a complex for Bogdanov, as 
later formulated by Varela, Maturana and Uribe (1974), is not an 
information-translation or norms-transferring process, but a 
process of coordinating the behaviour of entangled complexes 
via their mutual structural coupling.
The immediate aim of the author of tektology was to come 
up with practical methods of optimal planning in support of 
the dynamic equilibrium and resilience of social complexes 
(organisations), taken within their own environments (which 
are not two-dimensional ‘fields’ for him, but multivariate 
adaptive complexes themselves). The said is closer to 
understanding resilience “as a set of practices and techniques” 
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adaptation, transformation and survival” (Humbert, Joseph 
2019: 215), but has less in common with the advancement of 
neoliberal governance in particular.4 Here we have a reading 
of resilience, which is adequate for addressing the issues 
of socio-political adaptation.5 In tektology, an organism is 
actively invading the processes, leading to functional ‘media 
conversion’. The adaptation of the environment to this 
organism, qua responsive emergent process, results from their 
coevolutionary transaction (Rispoli 2014: 62).
Conclusion
Applying IR theories to the study of the international role 
of the European Union is useful from at least two points of 
view. On the one hand, the highly complex nature of the EU, 
and the sophistication of the Union as an object of study, act as 
challenges to traditional IR, demanding that methods evolve. 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice and Alexander Bogdanov’s 
tektology, capable of advancing insights into organisational 
forms and behaviour, seem to be wholesome additions to the 
ever-widening array of our analytical and methodological tools. 
On the other hand, unlike the theories of regional integration 
(such as neofunctionalism, communication theory, and others) 
that researchers might resort to when analysing the European 
Union per se, IR theories, in general, prove more helpful in better 
understanding the EU as an international actor, a transnational 
agent/subject or a technology of interstate interactions.
With this article the case has been made in particular to employ 
Bogdanov’s tektology for conceptualising the European Union as 
a meta-organisation, observed in the form of post-state-centrist 
technology for achieving (presumably) more progressive socio-
political regime of macroregional proportions without losing 
the functional integrity of states and societies. On the basis of 
4 Those who critically access recent works on resilience are concerned that resilience-
thinking may promote neoliberal forms of governmentality and encourage a degree of 
political passivity (Mckeown and Glenn 2017). Jonathan Joseph and Ana Juncos confirm 
the broadly neoliberal character of current approaches to resilience in the sphere of 
global governance (2019).
5 Mark Pelling’s classification of adaptation practice identifies three levels of adaptation: 
resilience, transition, and transformation, distinguished primarily by the extent to 
which they challenge the status quo. Adaptation as resilience focuses on improving 
existing practices without questioning underlying assumptions, allowing, among other 
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‘possessing’ a more sophisticated technology (with its specific 
constitutive norms) and a set of original ‘soft’ governance 
methods, which might prove useful for regulating collective 
problems and achieving common goals beyond the borders 
of the EU, European elite is aspiring to cultural (normative) 
hegemony, to be achieved through institutionalising the 
EU as a legitimate coordinating centre of global governance, 
envisioning more regulation. But the neoliberal ideology, 
externally promoted by the European institutions, contradicts 
such aspirations: it advocates a minimal state and the 
replacement of state regulations by market mechanisms. 
Within the EU, this contradiction is being cross-dissolved with 
the help of multi-level governance and subsidiarity principle 
anticipated as its own relational structures. At the same time, 
the activities of the European governing elite do not present (as 
yet) cogent evidence of its ability to engage in transboundary 
deliberative resilience-thinking with other inhabitants of the 
international milieu. In Bogdanov’s terminology, this qualifies 
as a case of internal cognitive disingression, resulting from the 
habit to dualistically divide intellectuals from practitioners 
and the organisers from the organised (Gare 2000: 345), which 
still allows for the denial of access to rational discourse to the 
latter.
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